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PART

FOREIGN  
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DEPT.

EASTERN

TITLE: GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS: MULTILATERAL:

ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM: POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT:

IRAQI ATTITUDE:

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

DEPT.

NAME

DATE

DEPT.

NAME

DATE

E

DATE

RA

2/6

RA

23/6

RA

1/7

Ch? Montgomery

RA

2/5

RA

9/8

Ch? MacRae

RA

8/10

RA

9/10

RA

10/10

RA

11/10

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PART

SECURITY GRADING

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*Iraq attitude*

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 44 14 June, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 44 of 14 June,  
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Cairo,  
Washington, U.K. Mission New York.

Arab/Israel.

I called on Iraqi Prime Minister this morning at his request.

2. After stressing the importance which Iraq attached to re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom Tahir Yehya referred to need for assistance in Middle East area [2 grps. undec.] was a danger not only to his immediate neighbourhood, but also to the oil-producing States including the Gulf States. By her acceptance of United Nations Resolutions and of Jarring mission, Iraq had shown her peaceable intentions. Israel, had, on the other hand, rejected the United Nations Resolutions and indulged in almost daily attacks on her neighbours. She even talked of a further 5 million immigrants. Arab opinion was greatly disturbed and was asking what would be the next step.

3. The Iraqi authorities had during the last few days, I learn, proved that the Israelis were raising troops and were preparing for a second attack on Irbid or even an attack on Amman. If it materialized Arab public opinion, which was firmly behind resistance movement, would be violent and conflict might not, in view of [grp. undec. ?cold] war, be confined to Arab world.

4. The Iraqi Government looked to Her Majesty's Government, as a friendly government, to do everything possible (a) to restrain Israel from further aggression and (b) to induce her to respect United Nations resolutions.

5. His Excellency concluded by saying that Ministry of Foreign Affairs were preparing a memorandum on these lines and that it would be delivered to me tomorrow.

6. I told the Prime Minister that Her Majesty's Government's attitude was clearly indicated by their Mission at the November 1967 Security Council Resolution but undertook to inform you immediately.

7. The fact that he sent for me on Friday holiday is evidence of the importance which he attaches to démarche. I am not, however, able to judge whether it is intended mainly as a publicity operation or whether Iraqi Government are genuinely disturbed by reports they have received.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv No. 2, Amman No. 3, Beirut No. 10, Cairo No. 2, Washington No. 2, U.K. Mission New York No. 2.

Mr. Evans

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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JJJJ

*See reply*  
*21*  
*6*

CYPHER/CAT A

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BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 60

20 June, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 60 of 20 June.  
Repeated for information Saving Tel Aviv Amman Beirut  
Cairo Washington UKMIS New York.

My telegram No. 44: Arab/Israel.

The promised memorandum has not, repeat not, materialised. It is now, however, fairly clear that demarche was not intended as a publicity operation either as part of a general campaign or in connection with the visit of the Emir of Kuwait which took place on 15 June. There was no mention in the press even of my call on Prime Minister and this is unusual.

2. It seems Iraqi Government were genuinely concerned about possibility of further Israeli aggression.

3. Is there anything I can usefully say to Prime Minister?

Foreign Office please pass Saving Tel Aviv 1, Amman 1, Beirut 1, Cairo 1 Washington 1 UKMIS New York 1

Mr. Evans

[Repeated as requested]

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PPPPP

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Sir D. Allen

Mr. Burroughs

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 25 JUN 1968 K2/83
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IRAQProblem

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① When H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad called on Tahir Yahya, the Iraqi Prime Minister, on 14 June, the latter spoke to him on predictable lines about the Middle East situation and promised to send him a Memorandum covering the same ground the next day. In his telegram No.60 Mr. Evans reports that there is still no sign of the Memorandum; he expresses the view that Tahir Yahya's approach reflected a genuine concern about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Jordan involving the Iraqi troops there; and he asks whether there is anything he can usefully say to the Prime Minister.

②

Recommendation

2. That a telegram be sent to Baghdad on the lines of the attached draft giving Mr. Evans some talking points.

Argument

3. Since the Iraqi Prime Minister sent for Mr. Evans to make his points on the Arab/Israel question on a Friday (the weekly holiday in Iraq), Mr. Evans regards this as evidence of the importance which Tahir Yahya attaches to his démarche on this subject. The presence of 15,000

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/Iraqi...

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ES 10  
Iraqi troops in Jordan certainly gives the Iraqis cause to be genuinely concerned about reports, even if untrue, of an Israeli military build-up and intention to attack. In these circumstances the Iraqis may feel aggrieved if we do not react in some way to their approach though what Mr. Evans says must necessarily be couched in fairly general terms.

*J. Moberly*

(J.C. Moberly)  
21 June, 1968.

Copies to:

Sir D. Allen  
Mr. Lambert  
Mr. Speares  
Mr. Fearnley  
Mr. Arbuthnot

*R. Arbuthnot*  
21/6

*This reached me 24 June.*

*SA 24/6.*

*m. Montgomery* *24/6*

*Jan*  
*24. vi*

*Reg P.A.*

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Mr. Burroughs

IRAQ

Problem

When H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad called on Tahir Yahya, the Iraqi Prime Minister, on 14 June, the latter spoke to him on predictable lines about the Middle East situation and promised to send him a Memorandum covering the same ground the next day. In his telegram No. 60 Mr. Evans reports that there is still no sign of the Memorandum; he expresses the view that Tahir Yahya's approach reflected a genuine concern about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Jordan involving the Iraqi troops there; and he asks whether there is anything he can usefully say to the Prime Minister.

Recommendation

2. That a telegram be sent to Baghdad on the lines of the attached draft giving Mr. Evans some talking points.

Assessment

3. Since the Iraqi Prime Minister sent for Mr. Evans to make his points on the Arab/Israel question on a Friday (the weekly holiday in Iraq), Mr. Evans regards this as evidence of the importance which Tahir Yahya attaches to his demands on this subject. The presence of 15,000

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/Iraqi...

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(J.C. Moberly)  
21 June, 1968.

Copies to:

Sir D. Allen  
Mr. Lambert  
Mr. Spence  
Mr. Pearnley  
Mr. Arbuthnot

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**BAGHDAD**

**BAGHDAD**

Tel Aviv and Amman

Beirut, Cairo, Washington, UKMIS New York.

Your telegram No.60: Arab/Israel.

Tel Aviv  
Amman

You may at a convenient opportunity confirm to the Iraqi Prime Minister the great importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to an early settlement in the Middle East based on the Security Council's Resolution of 22 November, 1967. Unless you see objection, you should go on to speak as follows. In our view the principles set out in the November Resolution cover the legitimate rights of all concerned and provide an adequate basis for a reasonable settlement. We regard it as in the interests of all the peoples of the Middle East that the Resolution should be applied as a whole as soon as possible and to this end we continue to give our fullest support to the mission of Mr. Jarring. We believe that his talks in New York with the parties concerned offer an opportunity for moving

Beirut  
Cairo  
Washington  
UKMIS New York

Departmental

Eastern  
Arabian  
UN(Pol),  
WEAD  
Oil

XXXXX

CO: Med Dept.  
S.A. Dept.

MOD: DIS

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/towards..

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towards a settlement and, to facilitate this, we have urged and will continue to urge, the utmost restraint on all concerned. You could also draw attention to our public condemnation in the United Nations of violent acts, which can only make Mr. Jarring's task harder and you could refer to our well-known position on the Jerusalem issue, evidenced by our vote for the General Assembly's resolutions on Jerusalem of 4 and 14 July, 1967, and for the Security Council's resolution on the same subject of 21 May this year. You could say that we shall continue to urge all concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to respect the relevant United Nations resolutions, and that we shall encourage them to work for progress towards a settlement through the good offices of Mr. Jarring.

2. If the Prime Minister should express some disappointment at the progress of Mr. Jarring to date and urge the need for the United Kingdom to take a further lead with other Permanent Members of the Security Council, or if he should refer to the desirability of early action by the Council to lay down a timetable for putting the November Resolution into effect, you should say that as long as Mr. Jarring considers that there is virtue in continuing his consultations with the parties, we should give him all possible

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/support;

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support; in view of the talks which he has already undertaken he is in the best position to decide what procedures should now be followed in working for progress towards a settlement; it would be premature to think in terms of other initiatives unless he decides that he has come to the end of the road. We would not, however, rule out further Security Council action at some stage in the interests of progress towards a settlement, though we do not think the time is yet ripe for this.

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TELEGRAM SECTION  
Room 124 K.C.S.  
Communications Department

Eastern

YTC/1

\* ~~Please send copies of the following telegram~~

\* Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

[\*delete as applicable]

Baghdad 60

20/6

TO:

Arab/Israel dist  
plus Oil dist !

(Signed) .....

(Department) .....

(Date) .....

Action taken in Communications Department:

(Initials)  .....

(Date) 22/6 .....

**AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO**  
**THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION**

4

CYPHER/CAT A AND By ENG  
ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE  
TEL NUMBER 80

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP CO.

TO BAGHDAD

DATE 24 JUNE (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 80 OF 24 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AND AMMAN AND SAVING TO BEIRUT CAIRO WASHINGTON AND URMIS NEW YORK. (2)

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 60: ARAB/ISRAEL.

YOU MAY AT A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY CONFIRM TO THE IRAQI PRIME MINISTER THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ATTACH TO AN EARLY SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST BASED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER, 1967. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SPEAK AS FOLLOWS. IN OUR VIEW THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION COVER THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF ALL CONCERNED AND PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. WE REGARD IT AS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE APPLIED AS A WHOLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO THIS END WE CONTINUE TO GIVE OUR FULLEST SUPPORT TO THE MISSION OF MR JARRING. WE BELIEVE THAT HIS TALKS IN NEW YORK WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MOVING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT AND, TO FACILITATE THIS, WE HAVE URGED AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE, THE UTMOST RESTRAINT ON ALL CONCERNED. YOU COULD ALSO DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR PUBLIC CONDEMNATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS OF VIOLENT ACTS, WHICH CAN ONLY MAKE MR JARRING'S TASK HARDER AND YOU COULD REFER TO OUR WELL-KNOWN POSITION ON THE JERUSALEM ISSUE, EVIDENCED BY OUR VOTE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTIONS ON JERUSALEM OF 4 AND 14 JULY, 1967, AND FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION ON THE SAME SUBJECT OF 21 MAY THIS YEAR. YOU COULD ADD THAT, WHILE CONTINUING TO URGE ALL CONCERNED TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO RESPECT THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, WE SHALL ENCOURAGE THEM TO WORK FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF MR JARRING.

/2. IF

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-2-

2. IF THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD EXPRESS SOME DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE PROGRESS OF MR JARRING TO DATE AND URGE THE NEED FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE A FURTHER LEAD WITH OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OR IF HE SHOULD REFER TO THE DESIRABILITY OF EARLY ACTION BY THE COUNCIL TO LAY DOWN A TIMETABLE FOR PUTTING THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION INTO EFFECT, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT AS LONG AS MR JARRING CONSIDERS THAT THERE IS VIRTUE IN CONTINUING HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES, WE SHOULD GIVE HIM ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT: IN VIEW OF THE TALKS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN HE IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO DECIDE WHAT PROCEDURES SHOULD NOW BE FOLLOWED IN WORKING FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT: IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO THINK IN TERMS OF OTHER INITIATIVES UNLESS HE DECIDES THAT HE HAS COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD. YOU COULD ADD THAT WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AT SOME STAGE IN THE INTERESTS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, THOUGH WE DO NOT THINK THE TIME IS YET RIPE FOR THIS.

SOSFA.

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Eastern Dept

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TELEGRAM SECTION  
Room 124 K.C.S  
Communications Department

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent  
060 to BAGHDAD 24. 6. 68

TO:

Arab / Israel Dispute  
Distn

(Signed) .....  
(Department) .....  
(Date) .....

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials) ... W.H.W. : ... (Date) ... 25. 6. 68 ...

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\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
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Immediate  
~~Priority~~  
Routine

(Date).....

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~~For Official Use~~  
~~Codex~~  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

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[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. 80 (date) 24/6

And to

repeated for information to Tel Aviv and Amman

Saving to Beirut, Cairo, Washington, UKMIS New York.

Your telegram No.60: Arab/Israel.

You may at a convenient opportunity confirm to the Iraqi Prime Minister the great importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to an early settlement in the Middle East based on the Security Council's Resolution of 22 November, 1967. Unless you see objection, you should go on to speak as follows. In our view the principles set out in the November Resolution cover the legitimate rights of all concerned and provide an adequate basis for a reasonable settlement. We regard it as in the interests of all the peoples of the Middle East that the Resolution should be applied as a whole as soon as possible and to this end we continue to give our fullest support to the mission of Mr. Jarring. We believe that his talks in New York with the parties concerned offer an opportunity for moving

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/towards...

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 80

(Date) 24/6

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Tel Aviv -109  
Amman -1004

Saving to:—

Beirut -1163 sero.  
Cairo -319 sero.  
Washington -187 sero.  
UKMIS New York

938 sero.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

24/6.

694/5  
24/6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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towards a settlement and, to facilitate this, we have urged and will continue to urge, the utmost restraint on all concerned. You could also draw attention to our public condemnation in the United Nations of violent acts, which can only make Mr. Jarring's task harder and you could refer to our well-known position on the Jerusalem issue, evidenced by our vote for the General Assembly's resolutions on Jerusalem of 4 and 14 July, 1967, and for the Security Council's resolution on the same subject of 21 May this year. You could ~~say~~ <sup>add</sup> that, ~~we shall~~ <sup>while</sup> continuing to urge all concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to respect the relevant United Nations resolutions, ~~and that~~ we shall encourage them to work for progress towards a settlement through the good offices of Mr. Jarring.

2. If the Prime Minister should express some disappointment at the progress of Mr. Jarring to date and urge the need for the United Kingdom to take a further lead with other Permanent Members of the Security Council, or if he should refer to the desirability of early action by the Council to lay down a timetable for putting the November Resolution into effect, you should say that as long as Mr. Jarring considers that there is virtue in continuing his consultations with the parties, we should give him all possible

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/support;

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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support; in view of the talks which he has already undertaken he is in the best position to decide what procedures should now be followed in working for progress towards a settlement; it would be premature to think in terms of other initiatives unless he decides that he has come to the end of the road. <sup>You could add that we would not</sup> ~~We would not, however,~~ rule out further Security Council action at some stage in the interests of progress towards a settlement, though we do not think the time is yet ripe for this.

SA<sup>24</sup>/6.CONFIDENTIAL

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FM ASOLKS NR 115

TO PP ASOLHY 07126

GR 22



BT

YOUR TEL NO 80.

ARAB/ISRAEL. PLEASE SEND BY NEXT BAG COPIES OF SECURITY  
COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS REFFERRED TO.

Mr. EVANS

BT

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By Bag

SAVING TELETYPE

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
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27 JUN 1968  
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No. 3 Saving of 22 June, 1968.

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E2/83

Addressed to the Foreign Office telegram No. 3 Saving of 22 June, repeated for information Saving to Tel Aviv (2 S), Amman (2 S), Beirut (2 S), Washington (3 S) Cairo (2 S), UKMis, New York (2 S).

My telegram No. 50. The following is the text of a communication which on the instructions of the Iraqi Prime Minister was handed to me this morning by the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Begins:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, with reference to the conversation which took place on the morning of Friday 14 June 1968 between the Prime Minister, Lt. General Tahir Yahya, and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Baghdad, has the honour to state that the Iraqi authorities have evidence of the existence of vast Israel military concentrations along the cease fire lines. This confirms once more that Israel has new aggressive designs against the Arab people of Palestine and against neighbouring Arab States. The Government of the Iraqi Republic do not discount the possibility that new aggression will be launched by Israel; Israel has never shrunk from launching military attacks and rendering hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs homeless, thereby contravening the principles of the U.N. Charter and of the World Charter on Human Rights, the decisions of the United Nations and of the Security Council, International Conventions, and International Law.

/Continued

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2/7

Continued Israeli aggression, which has been condemned by world public opinion, constitutes a dangerous threat to the existence of Palestine and to the peace and stability of the Arab States and of the Middle East, and ultimately threatens world peace.

Whilst all Arab States showed their goodwill towards the efforts of the United Nations in the cause of peace in the Middle East, the Israel authorities very savagely launched repeated military attacks for their well-known aggressive and expansionist purposes and refused to implement the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly, of the Security Council and of the International Conference on Human Rights, thereby defying world public opinion, which has had its fill of Israel's neglect of all humanitarian ideals and values.

The Government of the Iraqi Republic, who have welcomed the restoration of diplomatic relations with Her Britannic Majesty's Government and who are anxious to strengthen relations of friendship and economic and commercial co-operation between the two countries, wish to make it clear that the Israel danger threatens not only the peace and safety of the Arab States but also international commercial and economic relations and the interests of other States and peoples, particularly those which have economic and oil interests in the Arab world.

The Government of the Iraqi Republic, in putting these facts before Her Britannic Majesty's Government earnestly beg the Embassy to recommend that the British Government should put pressure on Israel to end its continued aggressive, expansionist and inhuman activities and should co-operate with members of the Security Council to do what they can to prevent Israel from carrying out its aggressive activities and to impose penalties on Israel to oblige it to carry out the decisions of the United Nations, the decisions of the Security Council, the decisions of the International Conference on Human Rights and international agreements. The efforts exerted by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in this question will without doubt serve to maintain security and peace, not only in this area but throughout the world.

The Ministry avails etc..

Ends.

2. This communication, although in the form of a note, is unnumbered, is not on the Ministry's official paper and does not bear the Ministry's seal. The week's delay in letting us have it may well be due to preoccupation with visits to Baghdad by the Amir of Kuwait and the Yemeni Prime Minister. If so, it may indicate that the Iraqis' motive is not so much fear of an Israeli attack as a wish to put us on notice that in oil they still have a weapon that albeit reluctantly they might be compelled to use against us. I have not yet ascertained whether a similar démarche has been made to my Soviet and French colleagues; if not, it is a further indication that the purpose is as I have suggested above.

Mr. Evans.

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BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 73 26 June, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL



E2/83

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 73 of 26 June, Repeated for information to Amman, Tel Aviv and Saving to Beirut, Cairo, U.K. Mission New York, Washington.

Your telegram No. 80: Arab/Israel.

I am grateful for your helpful instructions and shall take an early opportunity of seeing the Prime Minister on his return from Tehran on 29 June.

2. The Iraqi Ambassador to London has since told me that he was opposed to the sending of this communication by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in its original form it was even more verbose and that the Iraqi Government were expecting too much of Her Majesty's Government by way of support in the matter of Palestine.

3. [Grp. undec.] at present he has not, repeat not, received a similar communication.

4. The Iraqi fears of further Israel attack are no doubt genuine, but it is now fairly clear the Prime Minister's motive for making this démarche was to use resumption of diplomatic relations to enlist Her Majesty's Government's support as regards Palestine.

5. The approach was, as Mr. Khalaf virtually admitted, heavy-handed. On the other hand, the present régime has shown that it is capable of some realism and moderation and it is to be hoped this will hold good in the matter of Palestine too. We should, I think, encourage the trend by understanding of their problems and [grp. omitted] for their difficulties.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv No. 2, Amman No. 5 and Saving to Beirut No. 3, Washington No. 4, Cairo No. 3, U.K. Mission New York No. 3.

Mr. Evans


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Mr. [Signature] 3/7  
Mr. [Signature] 2/7



(8)

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 84

3 July, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

-17.  
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 84 of 3 July,  
Repeated for information Saving to Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut,  
Washington, Cairo and UK Mission New York.

My telegram No. 73: Arab/Israel.

I called on the Iraqi Prime Minister this morning and  
spoke on the lines of first paragraph of your telegram No. 80.

-14  
2. The Prime Minister's reaction was to smile wryly and to  
ask whether you, Sir, thought Jarring's mission would succeed.  
I said that you thought there was "a prospect of making  
progress", quoting what you told the Foreign Press Association  
- please see Guidance telegram No. 158.

3. At the Prime Minister's request I am preparing a memorandum  
summarizing what I told him. He said that he would submit it  
to the Council of Ministers.

Foreign Office pass Saving Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut,  
Washington, Cairo, UK Mission New York.

Mr. Evans

/Repeated as requested/

H. Evans 9/7

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TELEGRAM SECTION  
Room 124 K.C.S  
Communications Department

*Eastern Dept.*

YTC/1

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

*0167 fm Baghdad ——— 7. 8. 68.*

TO:

*MR. A.M. Palliser,*

*No. 10.*

*D/St.*

(Signed) .....

(Department) .....

(Date) .....

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials) *W. H. W.* (Date) *9. 8. 68*

**AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO  
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION**

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CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167

TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
7 AUGUST 1968

*copy on E2/54*

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 167 OF 7 AUG REPTD FOR  
INFMN SAVING TO ANKARA AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN CAIRO JEDDA TEHRAN  
TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

PALESTINE.

THE NEW IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON WHOM I CALLED  
THIS MORNING SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER  
1967 WAS IN GENERAL TERMS AND THAT IT WAS VARIOUSLY INTERPRETED BY  
THE PARTIES CONCERNED. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT BUT AGREE BUT POINTED  
OUT THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT IT WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO  
GIVE MR JARRING FULL SUPPORT.

2. RECALLING MR GORONVY ROBERT'S LETTER OF 30 JULY TO MRS MCKAY M.P.,  
I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF REFERRING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ARAB  
GUERILLAS WHICH HAD BROUGHT ON THE HEADS OF THE ARABS ISRAELI BOMBS  
AT IRBID AND SALT. NO DOUBT THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD TAKEN DANGER  
INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PLEDGING THEIR SUPPORT TO THE FEDAYEEN. OF COURSE  
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS WERE UNDERSTANDABLE. IT OCCURRED TO ME, HOWEVER  
- I EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS MY PERSONAL SUGGESTION - THAT IF A POLIT-  
ICAL SOLUTION WAS TO BE FOUND, THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST A TRUCE IN  
GUERRILLA WARFARE. I RECALLED THAT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON

/IN

*Mr Evans*

*Draft reply to paragraph  
3 submitted.*

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*6/10/68  
r/e*

*Assn. 20/6*

*Mr Evans ap - to see EDir  
upheld note*

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-2-

IN CAIRO FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE CANAL ZONE AND EGYPTIAN GUERRILLAS HAD BEEN ACTIVE, I HAD MYSELF TAKEN PART IN ARRANGING WITH COLONEL NASSER, AS HE THEN WAS, LIMITED TRUCES WHICH HAD OFTEN PROVED TO BE BENEFICIAL. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT BRING PRESSURE ON THE PALESTINIANS (INDEED THEY WERE UNDER PRESSURE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION). BUT AGREED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LIMITED TRUCE MIGHT BE DISCUSSED WITH RESPONSIBLE FEDAYEEN LEADERS. 3. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE IDEA OF A LIMITED TRUCE IS ONE THAT COULD, WITH GREATER HOPE OF HAVING A PRACTICAL EFFECT, BE TAKEN UP ELSEWHERE.

F O PASS SAVING TO ANKARA AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN CAIRO JEDDA  
TEHRAN TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR EVANS.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

15 August, 1968.

E2/83

*copy on E2/54.*

In your telegram No. 167 reporting your call on the new Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs you raise the question of the possible effect which limited truces might have in reducing the level of guerrilla activity.

2. I agree that some restriction of the level of guerrilla activity may prove most useful if and when serious negotiation on a settlement, and therefore on the future status of the territory occupied in the June war, is going on. I do not, however, believe that it is an idea which would appeal to Arab Government, let alone to the Fedayeen themselves in present circumstances; it is open to very much the same counter-arguments as the point that Arab Governments should control the Fedayeen more closely because their activities continually set back the prospects of a settlement. This is in essence that the Fedayeen are freedom fighters, legitimately concerned to take direct action to recover their rightful territory, and that it would be neither right nor practicable in the face of Arab public opinion to curb these activities. In the circumstances it seems probable that extensive advocacy of the idea on our part would tend in fact to undermine our efforts to maintain and strengthen relations with the Arab Governments, and lead to renewed suggestions of Anglo-Israeli alignment since the Israelis would be only too happy to see the incursions stop, whereas on the Arab side we would be seeking to persuade them to give up the only form of direct leverage on Israeli policy which they conceive themselves as possessing.

(A. R. Moore)

His Excellency  
T. E. Evans, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,  
BAGHDAD.

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DRAFT

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LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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To:—

T.E. Evans,  
BAGHDAD

From

A.R. Moore  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Mr. Baker  
first*

*I agree  
entirely.*

*Assm 74/8*

In your telegram No. 167 reporting your call on the new Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs you raise the question of the possible effect which limited truces might have in reducing the level of guerrilla activity.

2. I ~~fully~~ agree that some restriction of the level of guerrilla activity may prove most useful if and when serious negotiation on a settlement, and therefore on the future status of the territory occupied in the June war, is going on. I do not, however, believe that it is an idea which would appeal to Arab Government, let alone to the Fedayeen themselves in present circumstances; it is open to very much the same counter-arguments as the point that Arab Governments should control the Fedayeen more closely because their activities continually set back the prospects of a settlement. This is in essence that the Fedayeen are freedom fighters, legitimately concerned to take direct action to recover their rightful territory, and <sup>that</sup> it would be neither right nor practicable in the face of <sup>public</sup> Arab opinion to curb these activities. In the circumstances it seems probable that extensive /advocacy

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*Our*  
advocacy of the idea on Arab part would tend in fact to undermine our efforts to maintain and strengthen relations with the Arab Governments, and lead to renewed suggestions of Anglo-Israeli alignment since the Israelis would be only too happy to see the incursions stop, whereas on the Arab side we would be seeking to persuade them to give up the only form of direct leverage on Israeli policy which they conceive themselves as possessing.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 2365

7 OCTOBER 1968

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2365 OF 7 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO WASHINGTON BAGHDAD AND SAVING  
TO BEIRUT JERUSALEM JEDDA BENGHAZI TRIPOLI MOSCOW AND PARIS.

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM TO F O NO 294:

ARAB/ISRAEL.

I CALLED ON ABDUL KARIM SHAIKHLY, FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ,  
AT HIS HOTEL THIS MORNING. DR M A DAUD, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WAS PRESENT (DR  
PACHACHI, WHO WAS PRESENT WHEN I HAD SAID THAT I WOULD LIKE TO  
PRESENT MY RESPECTS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS NOT).

2...I SPOKE OF THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
QUESTION DURING THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS, WHEN THE FOREIGN  
MINISTERS OF THE PARTIES AND OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ALL BE IN NEW YORK. WE NEEDED A CLEAR  
ASSURANCE FROM BOTH SIDES OF READINESS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION  
242 (67). THE ARABS CONCERNED WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RESTATE THEIR  
AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION IN ALL ITS PARTS. THE  
QUESTION WAS WHETHER WE COULD AGREE THROUGH DR JARRING TO GET INTO  
URGENT DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND ANNOUNCE THIS BEFORE THE END  
OF OCTOBER.

3...SHAIKHLY WAS AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT THE IRAQ POSITION ON  
RESOLUTION 242 WAS NOT THE SAME AS THAT OF THE U A R AND JORDAN.  
IRAQ WAS CONCERNED TO STRESS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST PRECEDE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE RESOLUTION. AFTER  
WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE, THERE COULD BE DISCUSSION ABOUT  
IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER U N RESOLUTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR  
EXAMPLE ON JERUSALEM AND THE REFUGEES. IN LATER DISCUSSION, WHEN I  
HAD SAID IT SEEMED TO ME ENTIRELY UNREALISTIC TO HOPE TO PERSUADE  
THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FIRST AND TALK AFTERWARDS, THE MINISTER SAID  
THAT THEY MUST AT LEAST PROCLAIM THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW BEFORE  
ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THE RESOLUTION COULD BE CONSIDERED. OTHER

/ ARAB

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I agree.

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ARAB COUNTRIES (THE INSTANCED ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA) DIFFERED IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 FROM THAT PLACED UPON IT BY THE EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS. AS TO THE REFUGEES, BRITAIN MUST WORK FOR THE ACCEPTANCE BY ALL OF THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS WAS THE ONLY JUST AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE DISPLACED PALESTINIANS.

4...ON THE JARRING MISSION, THE MINISTER, WHO HAD NOT SEEN JARRING, STATED THAT IT SEEMED TO BE QUITE CLEAR TO JARRING THAT ISRAEL WAS THE CHIEF PROCRASTINATOR IN THE TALKS OVER THE LAST TEN MONTHS. THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD JARRING THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE UP THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM, OR THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN, OR THE SYRIAN HEIGHTS. THEY HAD ALSO REFUSED TO DEFINE WHAT THEY MEANT BY "SECURE BOUNDARIES". THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THOSE WHO VOTED FOR RESOLUTION 242 MUST NOW PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO IMPLEMENT THAT RESOLUTION.

5...I UNDERTOOK TO TRY AND LET THE MINISTER HAVE SOME ACCOUNT OF HOW WE GET ON IN OUR TALKS HERE DURING THE COMING WEEK BEFORE HE LEAVES NEW YORK ON 12 OCTOBER.

6...I DID NOT COMMIT THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SEEING HIM, BUT SAID THAT I WOULD LET HIM KNOW LATER IF A MEETING WITH MR STEWART COULD BE FITTED IN.

F O PASS AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD AND SAVING BEJRUT JERUSALEM  
JEDDA BENGHAZI TRIPOLI MOSCOW AND PARIS.

LORD CARADON.

/ REPEATED AS REQUESTED /

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CHIER/CAT'A'  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 306

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- 8 OCT 1968  
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TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
DATED 8 OCTOBER 1968

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ADDS TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 306 OF 8 OCTOBER REPTD FOR  
INFMN SVG TO ANKARA AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN CAIRO JEDDA KUWAIT  
UKMIS NEW YORK TEHRAN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

PALESTINE.

BOTH PRESIDENT BAKR AND GENERAL TAKRITI, THE IRAQI DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, ON WHOM I CALLED ON  
6 OCTOBER TO INTRODUCE MR ARTHUR, THE ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY  
OF STATE DESIGNATE, SPOKE OF PALESTINE.

2. GENERAL TAKRITI SPOKE WITH SATISFACTION ABOUT HMG'S  
POLICY DURING RECENT MONTHS. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED, HOWEVER,  
THAT EVEN GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW WOULD  
EVENTUALLY DEVELOP.

3. PRESIDENT BAKR WHO, IN THE COURSE OF A REVIEW OF ANGLO/  
IRAQI RELATIONS, SAID THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WAS OPPOSED  
TO BOTH IMPERIALISM AND COMMUNISM, SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS AN  
UNACCEPTABLE INTRUSION IN THE ARAB HOMELAND AND THAT THOSE  
WHO ACCEPTED IT WERE TRAITORS. HOWEVER, HE SPOKE CALMLY AND  
WITHOUT EMOTION AND DID NOT LABOUR THE POINT. : WAS ABLE TO  
MAKE SOME OF THE POINTS IN YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 247.

E2/91

F O PASS SAVING TO ALL.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT'A'

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

DATED 10 OCTOBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDS TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 315 OF 10 OCTOBER REPTD  
FOR INFNM TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO ANKARA AMMAN BEIRUT  
BAHRAIN CAIRO JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 306 AND NEW YORK TEL NO 2365: PALESTINE.

IT MIGHT BE USEFUL, PARTICULARLY IF HE CAN SPARE THE TIME  
TO SEE THE IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOR THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE TO HAVE A SUMMARY OF THE IRAQI ATTITUDE.

2. IN A STATEMENT ON 8 AUGUST ON TAKING OFFICE, SHEIKHLI  
SAID THAT THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS REPRESENTED THE  
MINIMUM FOR JOINT ARAB ACTION, ADDING THAT IRAQ EMPHASISED  
THE NECESSITY OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWING HER OCCUPATION FORCES FROM  
ARAB TERRITORY CAPTURED AFTER 5 JUNE 1967 IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO WHICH ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE COMMITTED  
VIZ. NO RECOGNITION, NO PEACE AND NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
ISRAEL.

3. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS THE PRESENT REGIME LIKE ITS PREDEC-  
CESSOR HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE 22 NOVEMBER RESOLUTION IS  
UNPALATABLE. IN NOVEMBER 1967 THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED  
PRESS DESCRIBED THE RESOLUTION AS 'STILL BORN' AND THE JOINT  
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER FORMER PRESIDENT AREF'S VISIT TO FRANCE

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IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR STATED "THE TWO GOVERNMENTS RECALLING THE RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION WITHOUT THE PRIOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR". IN AUGUST SHEIKHLI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS REJECTED ANY U.N. RESOLUTION WHICH CONTRADICTED THE DECISIONS OF THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT MEETING.

4. SHEIKHLI RECENTLY TOLD MY CZECH COLLEAGUE THAT WHILE NOT ACCEPTING THE 22 NOVEMBER RESOLUTION THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR U A R AND JORDAN IF THE LATTER CAME TO TERMS WITH ISRAEL. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WOULD CO-OPERATE MILITARILY WITH JORDAN AND THE U A R AND ALSO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO ARAB GUERILLAS. THIS I THINK SUMS IT UP.

F.O. PASS UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO ANKARA AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN  
CAIRO JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

MR.EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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14/10

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY GENERAL DEBATE

Attached is an unofficial summary record of the  
speech by the representative of **IRAQ**  
in the General Debate on **11 October 1968**

If geographic Departments consider that other Departments  
may be interested in particular passages, would they  
kindly mark it on as appropriate.

2. If a sight of the full verbatim text is required,  
please return this minute to Mr. R.E. Escritt, United  
Nations (Pol) Department, Room 189 (from 18 October,  
Room 144), King Charles Street.

E

ASSEMBLY PLENARY -- TAKE 1

The General Assembly met this morning to continue its general debate. The representatives of Iraq, Albania, Austria and Hungary are listed to speak.

The acting President, MEHDI VAKIL (Iran), called the meeting to order at 11:03 a.m.

ABDUL KARIM AL-SHAIKHLI, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, said that the General Assembly was meeting again in an atmosphere filled with anxiety and foreboding. The deterioration of the international situation, he said, was most evident in the Middle East.

The causes of the conflict in the Middle East, he stated, were twofold: first, the failure to find a just solution to the Palestine question which would guarantee the right of self-determination to the people of Palestine to live in freedom and peace in their ancestral homeland; second, Israel was pursuing "aggressive and expansionist" policies against the Arab States.

To reduce tension in the area, he went on, the Assembly could not ignore the right of Arabs in Palestine to survive as a "distinct and homogeneous" national community. Nor could it be forgotten that the problems in the Middle East were the result of the onslaught of Zionism against the people of Palestine.

Iraq, he said, would employ all available means inside and outside the United Nations to render assistance to the people of Palestine in their struggle. The people of Palestine, who were the "victims of an unparalleled racist colonial invasion", were entitled to the support of other peoples of the world in their struggle to recover their lost homeland, he declared.

(END OF TAKE 1)

ASSEMBLY PLENARY — TAKE 2

Continuing, Mr. AL-SHAIKHLY, Foreign Minister of Iraq, said that there was virtual unanimity in the general debate last year to uphold the Charter principles relating to the inadmissibility of territorial expansion by force.

A whole year had passed and Israeli occupation still continued. Israel had annexed Arab Jerusalem in violation of the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Many steps had also been taken by Israel to incorporate the rest of the Western Bank, politically and economically, with Israel.

In the occupied territories, he said, Israel continued to demolish homes and to imprison thousands, inflicting upon them "unspeakable degradations and torture". To hide these crimes, he said, Israel had refused to accept the Secretary-General's Special Representative who was sent to the area to investigate the conditions of the civilian population in the territory occupied in June 1967.

He said that Israel had expanded its aggression during the past year by launching unprovoked large-scale attacks on many areas in Jordan. This behavior, he said, was further proof of Israel's lack of respect for the principles of international law and its utter disregard of the United Nations Charter.

It also confirmed, he declared, Israel's intention to annex the territories it had occupied.

The failure of the United Nations to deal with Israeli aggression, he said, eroded faith and confidence in the Organization. The United Nations must demonstrate that its principles were applicable to all without discrimination, he declared.

(END OF TAKE 2)

ASSEMBLY PLENARY -- TAKE 3

Continuing, Mr. AL-SHAIKHLY, Foreign Minister of Iraq, said that Israel would not have dared to commit these aggressive acts if it had not been sustained in its action by its "unholy alliance" with the United States.

The United States, a permanent member of the Security Council, had ignored its responsibility to respect the Charter and to uphold international justice. The decision of the United States Government, he said, to negotiate with Israel on the sale of supersonic Phantom jets was proof of its bias towards Israel.

He then referred to the Secretary-General's report of last year calling for the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the occupied Arab territories, and stated the passage of time had not diminished the "pertinence and urgency" of that statement.

In the face of the blatantly expansionist design of Israel, he said, there could be no compromise or retreat. There could be no settlement, and not even the beginning of a rational discussion of the underlying causes before unconditional withdrawal from every inch of Arab territory.

It was indeed strange, he went on, that Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, should come before the Assembly and speak of peace, justice, and respect for the United Nations Charter. World public opinion, he stated, could no longer be deceived by Zionist propaganda, despite its influence and recognized competence, since it was unable to conceal the crimes which "have been and still are being committed by Israel in the occupied territories".

(END OF TAKE 3)

ASSEMBLY PLENARY -- TAKE 4

Continuing, Mr. AL-SHAIKHLY, Foreign Minister of Iraq, said that if the present state of vacillation, apathy and deference to the Israeli aggressor continued, then the Arab nation would have no alternative but to employ all possible means to liberate the occupied territories.

He then referred to the "illegal and arbitrary measures" taken by Israel to annex the city of Jerusalem and to desecrate Muslim and Christian holy places there.

Israel, he said, had disregarded the resolutions of the General Assembly which had called on it to rescind the measures taken to annex the city of Jerusalem and the adjacent areas. The implementation of these resolutions was a matter of the highest importance and urgency, he declared.

Speaking on Viet-Nam, the Foreign Minister of Iraq said that the Vietnamese people were victims of "vicious, imperialist aggression", but he was confident that the Vietnamese people would be eventually victorious in their struggle against the United States which had transformed Viet-Nam into a testing-ground for new weapons of mass destruction.

The United States policy in Viet-Nam and its support of Israeli aggression against the people of Palestine, he went on to say, both "flow from its stubborn policy to further its self-interest at the expense of the rights of peoples".

His country, he said, joined with the others the world over in demanding the immediate and unconditional halt to the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as a prerequisite for restoring peace in the area.

(END OF TAKE 4)

Political Affairs - Multilateral; Arab/Israel Problem - Possibility Of Settlement: Iraqi Attitude. Iraq. 15 Oct. 1968. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/78. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473809/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=62d5742b&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473809/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=62d5742b&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.